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Monetary policy instruments diﬀer in tightness–how closely they are linked to inﬂation–and trans-
parency–how easily they can be monitored. Tightness is always desirable in a monetary policy instru-
ment; when is transparency? When a government cannot commit to follow a given policy. We apply
this argument to a classic question: Is the exchange rate or the money growth rate the better monetary
policy instrument? We show that if the instruments are equally tight and a government cannot commit
to a policy, then the exchange rate’s greater transparency gives it an advantage as a monetary policy
instrument.
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a much clearer signal to the public of the government’s intentions and actual actions than
a money supply target. Thus, if the public’s inﬂationary expectations are inﬂuenced to a
large extent by the ability to easily track and continuously monitor the nominal anchor, the
exchange rate has a natural advantage [Calvo and Végh, 1999, p. 1589].
True, the exchange rate has some special properties. In particular, it is easily observable,
so the private sector can directly monitor any broken promises by the central bank. But we
know of no convincing argument that turns these properties into an explanation for why it
would be a more eﬃcient method to achieve credibility to target the exchange rate rather
than, say, the money growth rate [Persson and Tabellini, 1994, p. 17].
A classic question in international economics is whether the exchange rate or the money growth
rate is the better instrument of monetary policy. A common answer–oﬀered, for example, by
Calvo and Végh [1999]–is that the exchange rate has a natural advantage over the money growth
rate as an instrument of monetary policy because the exchange rate is easier for the public to
observe; it is more transparent. Skeptics of this view agree that the exchange rate is easier for the
public to monitor. Still–as Persson and Tabellini [1994] point out–no clear theoretical argument
has been made that explains why the transparency of the exchange rate gives it a natural advantage
as a monetary policy instrument. We provide such a theoretical argument here.
We build on the analyses of Canzoneri [1985], Zarazaga [1995], and Herrendorf [1997] using
a simple model of sustainable monetary policy similar to that of Kydland and Prescott [1977]
and Barro and Gordon [1983]. In our model, each period, the government chooses one of two
regimes for monetary policy: an exchange rate regime or a money regime. Under the exchange
rate regime, the government picks as its monetary policy instrument the rate of depreciation of
the exchange rate of its currency with that of some foreign country. By choosing this exchange
rate, the government sets the mean inﬂation rate, and realized domestic inﬂation varies with
shocks both to the inﬂation rate in the foreign country and to the real exchange rate.1 Under
the money regime, the government picks as its instrument a money growth rate, thus setting the
mean inﬂation rate, and realized inﬂation varies with domestic inﬂation shocks. Hence, under both
regimes, the government sets the mean inﬂation rate, and realized inﬂation varies with exogenous
shocks. Under both regimes, then, the government is targeting inﬂation; it is just using diﬀerent
instruments to attempt to hit its target.The instruments that deﬁne these regimes diﬀer in two respects: their tightness and their
transparency. One instrument is tighter than another if it is more closely linked to inﬂation.2
In our setup, the relative tightness of the instruments depends on the relative variance of the
foreign and domestic shocks.3 One instrument is more transparent than another if it is more easily
observed by the public. In our setup, we assume for simplicity that the exchange rate is perfectly
observed while only a noisy signal of the money growth rate is observed. We thus refer to the
exchange rate as the transparent instrument a n dt h em o n e yg r o w t hr a t ea st h eopaque instrument.
Tightness is desirable in an instrument because the government dislikes variability in inﬂa-
tion. We show that transparency is desirable in an instrument only because this characteristic
helps mitigate the credibility problems that arise when a government cannot commit to follow a
given monetary policy.
To emphasize this point, we compare the relative desirability of the two types of instruments
in two types of environments. We ﬁrst consider an environment in which the government can
commit to its policies and, hence, has no credibility problems. We show that with commitment, the
relative desirability of instruments does not depend on their transparency: the tighter instrument
is always preferred. We then consider an environment in which the government has credibility
problems because it cannot commit to its policies. In this environment, we show that the relative
desirability of instruments depends on both their tightness and their transparency. Tightness
is desirable without commitment for the same reason it is desirable with commitment: a tighter
instrument leads to less variable inﬂation. Transparency is desirable without commitment because
it helps alleviate credibility problems. To illustrate this point, we show that the transparent
instrument, the exchange rate, may be preferred to the opaque one, the money growth rate, even
if money growth is the tighter instrument.
The intuition for our results is straightforward. Under either regime, when there is no
commitment, the government has a temptation to surprise the public with higher than expected
inﬂation in order to decrease unemployment. In order to achieve a good outcome, the equilibrium
strategies must have two features simultaneously. The strategies must ensure that the government
gets a high payoﬀ when it chooses low inﬂation and a low payoﬀ when it deviates to high inﬂation.
With a transparent instrument, any deviation is perfectly detectable, there is no conﬂict between
these two features, and the economy need never experience periods with low payoﬀsf o rt h eg o v -
ernment. With an opaque instrument, however, these two features conﬂict. To deter deviations to
2high money growth, the equilibrium strategies must ensure that high realizations of inﬂation are
followed by low payoﬀs for the government. Since high realizations of inﬂation will occur even if
the government does not deviate, with such strategies at least some period of low payoﬀsf o rt h e
government must be realized in equilibrium.
The result about the advantage of transparency is easiest to show under the assumptions
that inﬂation is the only signal of money growth and that money growth is never observable. But
we show that our results hold even when agents see other signals or when they observe money
growth after a lag.
We show that a certain price, the exchange rate, has a natural advantage over a certain
quantity, the money growth rate, as a monetary policy instrument. A natural question is, does
this analysis extend to the relative advantage of another price, the interest rate, over the money
growth rate as a monetary policy instrument? Our analysis suggests that the answer depends on
exactly how the interest rate is used in monetary policy. We discuss the application of our model
to interest rates after presenting our main results.
Our analysis builds on the seminal contribution of Canzoneri [1985], who assumes that a
private information problem arises under a money regime because the money growth rate is an
opaque instrument. Canzoneri [1985] discusses what might occur in the best equilibrium with
transparent or opaque instruments when a government has credibility problems. Here we extend
his analysis. Most interesting to us is what happens when the opaque instrument, here money
growth, is the preferred one. This will be true when money growth is suﬃciently tight. With such
an instrument, agents cannot tell whether unexpectedly high realized inﬂation is the result of the
government’s choice of a high money growth rate or is simply the result of a large domestic inﬂation
shock. Because of this lack of transparency, the optimal outcome necessarily oscillates at random
between two extreme phases, with low and high average inﬂation. This random oscillation along
the equilibrium path is analogous to the outcomes obtained by Green and Porter [1984] and Abreu,
Pearce, and Stacchetti [1986] in their analyses of equilibrium price wars among oligopolists.4
Our work here is most closely related to the work of Stokey [2003] and Herrendorf [1997].
Stokey [2003] builds on our analysis, but focuses on using simple two-state Markov perfect equi-
libria and shows how to solve for the best equilibria in this class under either a money regime
or an exchange rate regime. Herrendorf [1997] considers an optimal taxation game in which the
monetary authority must ﬁnance a given amount of spending with a combination of direct taxes
3and inﬂation taxes. The monetary authority can choose a transparent ﬁxed exchange rate regime
in which it must set some ﬁxed suboptimal exchange rate peg or an opaque money regime in which
it is free to choose any rate of money growth. Herrendorf gives an intriguing example in which if
the signal of money growth is suﬃciently noisy, then the only equilibrium in the money regime is
the repeated one-shot equilibrium. Thus, with suﬃciently noisy signals, the money regime can be
worse than the ﬁxed exchange rate regime with a ﬁxed suboptimal peg.5
Here we have used a simple reduced-form model of money. Chang [1998] and Phelan and
Stacchetti [2001] use recursive methods to analyze some general equilibrium macroeconomic models
with perfect monitoring.
1. Two Monetary Policy Instruments
We start by presenting a model of monetary policy in which, each period, the government
selects either an exchange rate regime, in which it uses the rate of depreciation of the exchange
rate as its policy instrument, or a money regime, in which it uses the rate of growth of the money
supply as its policy instrument.
In the model, time is discrete, and time periods are denoted t =0 ,1,2,.... The economy
consists of a continuum of private agents and a government. Agents choose the rate of change
of their individual wages before inﬂation is realized. Agents dislike unemployment, inﬂation, and
changes in real wages due to unexpected inﬂation. The government chooses monetary policy to
maximize the agents’ utility.
The timing of actions within each period is as follows. At the beginning of a period, the
government chooses a regime for monetary policy, namely, whether it will use the rate of depreci-
ation of the exchange rate or the rate of growth of the money supply as its policy instrument in
the current period. If it chooses the (crawling peg) exchange rate regime, the government opens
a trading desk at which it trades domestic and foreign currency. If it chooses the money regime,
the government does not open this desk. The presence or absence of the trading desk is thus an
observable indicator of the current regime. After the government’s choice of regime, agents choose
their nominal wages. Finally, depending on the regime, the government chooses either the speciﬁc
rate of depreciation of the exchange rate or the speciﬁc rate of growth of the money supply. The
government is free to switch regimes at the beginning of each period.
For convenience, we will describe the economy for a given period t starting at the end of the
period and working backward to the beginning. At the end of the period, when the government
4chooses the speciﬁc level of either the rate of depreciation of the exchange rate or the money
growth rate, it takes as given the average rate of wage inﬂation x set by agents earlier in the
period. Unemployment u i se q u a lt oac o n s t a n tU plus the gap between average wage inﬂation x
and realized inﬂation π.
Under the two regimes, realized inﬂation is a function of monetary policy as follows. Under
the exchange rate regime, the government chooses a rate of change in the exchange rate denoted
et = st − st−1, where st is the level of the exchange rate. For simplicity, however, we refer to et as
the exchange rate.I n ﬂation in the home country is given by
π = e + π
∗, (1)
where π∗ has a normal distribution with mean 0 and variance σ2
π∗.T h e v a r i a b l e π∗ reﬂects a
combination of inﬂation in foreign countries and shocks to the real exchange rate. For simplicity,
we refer to π∗ as foreign inﬂation. Thus, by choosing an exchange rate, the government sets
the mean domestic inﬂation rate to be e, while the variance of domestic inﬂation is determined
by shocks in the foreign country which are outside the domestic government’s control. Foreign
inﬂation π∗ is observed only after the exchange rate is chosen. We let g(π|e) denote the density
of realized domestic inﬂation given the choice of exchange rate e.
Under the money regime, the government chooses a money growth rate µ. Given µ, realized
inﬂation π is given by
π = µ + ε, (2)
where ε represents domestic inﬂation shocks which are normally distributed with mean 0 and
variance σ2
ε. Thus, by choosing the money growth rate, the government sets the mean domestic
inﬂation rate to be µ, and the variance of domestic inﬂation is determined by domestic shocks
outside of the government’s control. We interpret the imperfect connection between money growth
and inﬂation as arising from some combination of the government’s imperfect control over actual
(as opposed to desired) money growth and a noisy relation between money growth and inﬂation.
We let f(π|µ) denote the density of realized domestic inﬂation given the choice of money growth
rate µ.
We say that the money growth rate is a tighter instrument than the exchange rate if and
only if σ2
ε <σ 2
π∗. To model the idea that exchange rates are more transparent than money growth
rates in that they are easier for the public to monitor, we assume that under both regimes, agents
5can see the exchange rate e and the inﬂation rate π but not the money growth rate µ. Thus, under
an exchange rate regime, agents directly see the actions of the government, while under a money
regime, they do not. In the money regime, inﬂation serves as a noisy signal of the government’s
actions. We refer to the exchange rate as the transparent instrument and the money growth rate
as the opaque instrument.
Under both regimes, equations (1) and (2) both hold. In the exchange rate regime, e is
the choice variable and the money growth rate µ is endogenously determined, while in the money
regime, µ is the choice variable and the exchange rate e is endogenously determined. In these
regimes, the government’s choice of either e or µ determines the mean inﬂation rate. In this sense,
in both regimes, the government is targeting inﬂation.
In the middle of each period, each agent chooses the change in the agent’s own wage rate
from period t − 1 to period t, where this change is denoted zt. For simplicity, we refer to zt as
individual wages and let xt denote the corresponding average rate of wage change. An agent’s












where on the right side, the ﬁrst term in the brackets reﬂects unexpected changes in this agent’s
real wages, the second term is unemployment, and the third is realized inﬂation. Each agent
can choose z diﬀerently depending on whether the regime is an exchange rate regime or a money
regime. We denote these choices by ze and zµ and the corresponding average wage rates by xe and













Notice that under either regime, agents aim to choose wages equal to mean inﬂation, either e or
µ, depending on the regime.
In what follows, we focus on equilibria which are symmetric; all agents choose the same
individual wages, so that xe = ze and xµ = zµ. Thus, all agents have the same utility. The
6government’s expected payoﬀsa r eS(xe,e)=SA(xe,x e,e) and R(xµ,µ)=RA(xµ,x µ,µ) under the





























Notice that the government’s expected payoﬀs in the two regimes are symmetric with respect to
the policy variables e and µ. In particular, the functions S and R diﬀer only with respect to the
uncontrollable variances σ2
π∗ and σ2
ε, which are constants. Clearly, from (6) and (7), we know
that tightness is a desirable characteristic of an instrument. We ensure that the government’s
payoﬀs are bounded by assuming that the policies e and µ are bounded above and below by some
arbitrarily large constants.





t[(1 − it)S(xet,e t)+itR(xµt,µ t)], (8)
where 0 <β≤ 1 is the discount factor and it is a variable that indicates the regime chosen in
period t, where it =0for the exchange rate regime and it =1for the money regime. Here xet
denotes the average wages chosen in period t if an exchange rate regime is chosen and xµt denotes
the average wages chosen in period t if a money regime is chosen. The discounted payoﬀsf o rt h e
agents are written similarly.
2. Two Environments
Now we examine the relative desirability of tightness and transparency in two environments:
when the government can commit to its monetary policy and when it cannot. We conclude
that tightness is desirable in both environments, but transparency is desirable only when the
government cannot commit.
A. With Commitment
We ﬁrst suppose that the government can commit to a monetary policy once and for all in
period 0. We show that when the government can commit to its policy, the relative desirability
of instruments does not depend on their transparency: the tighter instrument is always preferred.
Here this means that an exchange rate regime is preferred to a money regime if and only if the
volatility of foreign inﬂa t i o ns h o c k si sl e s st h a nt h a to fd o m e s t i ci n ﬂation shocks. Thus, with
7commitment, exchange rates derive no advantage as a monetary policy instrument from their
transparency.
In this environment with commitment, at the beginning of period 0, the government chooses
the sequence {it,e t,µ t}∞
t=0 indicating the regime it will follow and the exchange rate or money
growth rate it will implement under that regime in each period. After this, in each period t,
agents choose wages zet or zµt, depending on the regime. Given (4) and (5), the optimal choices
for agents are clearly zet = et and zµt = µt; hence, in equilibrium, average wages satisfy
xet = et and xµt = µt. (9)
Here the optimal policies and allocations solve the Ramsey problem of choosing sequences
{it,e t,µ t,x et,x µt}∞
t=0 to maximize the government’s discounted payoﬀ (8) subject to the equilibrium
condition on agents’ average wages (9). This problem reduces to a sequence of static problems
of choosing e and µ to solve maxeS(e,e) and maxµ R(µ,µ) and then choosing the regime that
leads to the higher payoﬀ. Since the government’s payoﬀs are symmetric with respect to the
policy variables, the optimal exchange rate and money growth rate are identical (both 0), and the
government simply picks the regime with the lower variance of inﬂation. We denote this maximum
payoﬀ as vR and refer to it as the Ramsey payoﬀ. We summarize this result as
Proposition 1. Only Tightness Matters With Commitment.
When the government can commit to its monetary policies, the tighter instrument is preferred
regardless of its transparency. Thus, with commitment, the exchange rate regime is preferred
to a money regime if and only if σ2
π∗ ≤ σ2
ε.
Here the optimal policy in both regimes is a constant. This occurs only because, for sim-
plicity, we have abstracted from any source of shocks that would make the policies vary.
B. Without Commitment
Now we suppose that the government cannot commit to its policies. In each period, it chooses
a regime; then, after agents set their wages, the government chooses the level of its monetary
policy instrument. For this environment, we show that transparency is a desirable feature for an
instrument. Speciﬁcally, we show that if the exchange rate and the money growth rate are equally
tight instruments, then, given any equilibrium in which the government chooses a money regime
8in some period t, we can construct another equilibrium in which the government chooses instead
an exchange rate regime in period t and obtains a strictly higher payoﬀ. Thus, even if money
growth is the tighter instrument, an exchange rate regime is preferred because of its transparency.
We say, therefore, that the exchange rate’s greater transparency gives it a natural advantage as a
monetary policy instrument.
In this environment, both the government and the agents choose their actions as functions of
the observed history of aggregate variables: the choice of regime, the exchange rate, and inﬂation.
In period t, this history is given by ht =( i0,e 0,π0;...;it−1,e t−1,πt−1). A strategy for the govern-
ment is a sequence of functions σG = {it(ht),e t(ht),µ t(ht)}
∞
t=0 that map histories into the choice of
regime it and corresponding exchange rates et or money growth rates µt. A strategy for agents is
a sequence of functions σA = {zet(ht),z µt(ht)}
∞
t=0 that map histories into actions zt, where zet(ht)
is only relevant if it(ht)=0and zµt(ht) is only relevant if it(ht)=1 . We also deﬁne a sequence
of functions σX = {xet(ht),x µt(ht)}
∞
t=0 that record the average wages chosen by agents after each
history. Let σ =( σG,σA,σX) denote the strategies of the government, the strategies of the agents,
and the average wages. Notice that in the histories, we need not record the history of average
wages since a deviation by any one agent cannot aﬀect this average. (For details on this point,
see, for example, Chari and Kehoe [1990].) Notice that in any history ht in which the exchange
rate is chosen in period t,t h ei n ﬂation rate in that period is simply a public random variable that
gives no strategic information. For notational simplicity, we assume that strategies following any
such history do not depend on the realized inﬂation rate under the exchange rate regime in period
t. L i k e w i s e ,i ft h em o n e yr e g i m ei sc h o s e ni np e r i o dt, the exchange rate in that period is a public
random variable that gives no strategic information beyond the information contained in inﬂation
πt. We assume that strategies following such a history do not depend on the realized exchange
rate in period t.
A perfect equilibrium in this environment is a collection of strategies σ such that (i) after
every history ht, the agents’ strategy σA is optimal given the government’s strategy σG and the
average of agents’ wages σX; (ii) after every history ht, the government’s strategy σG is optimal
given the average of agents’ wages σX; and (iii) after every history ht,σ A and σX agree.
Clearly, given agents’ payoﬀs (4) and (5), after any history ht, the agents’ best response to
the government strategy σG is to choose wages zet(ht)=et(ht) or zµt(ht)=µt(ht), depending on
9the regime. Thus, in any perfect equilibrium, average wages must satisfy
xet(ht)=et(ht) and xµt(ht)=µt(ht).
That is, in equilibrium, wage inﬂation must equal expected inﬂation.
To prove our main result, we formulate the incentive constraint of the government recursively,
by drawing on the work of Abreu, Pearce, and Stacchetti [1986, 1990]. Their basic idea comes
from a simple insight. A strategy is a prescription for current actions and all future actions
that follow every possible history. To evaluate the government’s incentive constraints, however,
we need not specify the whole sequence of future actions for the government and agents that
follow every possible current action that the government might take. Rather, all we need specify
is how the government’s payoﬀ from the next period on–its continuation value– w i l lv a r ya s
the government’s current action varies. This simple observation forms the basis for a recursive
approach to describing the incentive compatibility constraints for the government.
To formulate the incentive constraint of the government recursively, we ﬁrst show how strate-




. In any period t,
let Vt(ht;σ) be the expected discounted payoﬀ to the government following history ht under the
strategies σ. (Note that Vt(ht;σ) is essentially (8) evaluated from period t on, with expectations
over future histories taken with respect to the conditional distribution over these histories induced
by σ.)
We now deﬁne continuation values under a money regime and an exchange rate regime.
Suppose that, in period t following history ht, the government has chosen a money regime (it(ht)=
1) and agents have chosen wages xµt(ht). Since agents observe only inﬂation πt = µt + εt, which
is a noisy signal of µt, the equilibrium following period t as speciﬁed in a collection of strategies σ
cannot depend on the government’s choice of µt directly; it can vary only with inﬂation πt. Hence,
the government’s continuation value from next period on can be summarized by a continuation
value function under a money regime wµt(π,ht). This function equals the payoﬀ Vt+1(ht+1;σ) for
the government that occurs under σ following the history ht+1 = (ht,i t(ht)=1 ,e t = πt − π∗
t,πt).
Likewise, the continuation value function under an exchange rate regime wet(et,h t) equals the
payoﬀ Vt+1(ht+1;σ) for the government that occurs under σ following the history ht+1 =(ht,i t(ht)=
0,e t,πt = et + π∗
t).
In each period, the government has three incentive constraints, two for the choice of policy
within each regime and one for the choice of regime. Consider ﬁrst the incentive constraint for
10money growth in the money regime in period t.T h e s t r a t e g y σG speciﬁes that the government
choose µt(ht) in the current period. Given the current wage chosen by the agents xµt(ht) and
the continuation value function wµt(π,ht), the incentive constraint requires that there be no other
money growth rate µ0
t 6= µt(ht), such that the government could beneﬁt by deviating to µ0
t in the
period t and then acting according to its strategy σG from period t +1on; that is,










for any possible µ0
t. Notice that here a deviation µ0
t from the speciﬁed current action µt(ht) aﬀects
the government’s expected discounted payoﬀ only by shifting the distribution of inﬂation from
f(π|µt(ht)) to f(π|µ0
t).
Consider next the incentive constraint for the exchange rate in the exchange rate regime in
period t. Given the wages xet(ht) chosen by agents, this incentive constraint is





for any possible e0
t.
Finally, consider the incentive constraint for the choice of regime. In period t, after history
ht, the money regime is chosen, it(ht)=1 , only if
(1 − β)R(xµt(ht),µ t(ht)) + β
Z
wµt(π,ht)f(π|µt(ht))dπ ≥ (12)
(1 − β)S(xet(ht),e t(ht)) + βwet(et(ht),h t).
Likewise, the exchange rate regime is chosen, it(ht)=0 , only if (12) holds with the reverse weak
inequality.
Notice that in (10), (11), and (12) we are only considering one-shot deviations, that is,
changes in the current actions, holding ﬁxed the future strategies. A standard result in game theory
says that since the payoﬀs of the government are bounded, these recursive incentive constraints
are both necessary and suﬃcient for full incentive compatibility.
The following proposition establishes the precise advantage of the transparent instrument
when the government cannot commit to its policies.
11Proposition 2. The Advantage of Transparency.
When two monetary policy instruments have equal tightness and the government cannot
commit to its monetary policies, the transparent instrument is preferred to the opaque
instrument in the following sense. In any equilibrium σ in which the money regime is chosen
in some period t, there is an equilibrium ˜ σ with higher welfare in which the exchange rate
regime is chosen in period t and in other periods agrees with the original equilibrium.
The idea of the proof of this proposition is the following. To achieve a good outcome, the
continuation payoﬀ must have two features simultaneously. It must deter the government from
deviating from the prescribed policy, and it must give the government a high continuation payoﬀ
when the government does not deviate. With a transparent instrument, any deviation is perfectly
detectable, and these two features do not conﬂict. The continuation payoﬀ function can specify
the lowest possible continuation when there is any deviation and the highest possible continuation
when there is none. With an opaque instrument, however, the continuation payoﬀ function can
depend only on a noisy signal of the policy, so these features do conﬂict. If the continuation payoﬀ
function speciﬁes the highest payoﬀ regardless of the observed noisy signal, then the payoﬀ has
no deterrence value and results in the one-shot equilibrium outcome. If this function builds in
any deterrence value by prescribing lower continuation values for some inﬂa t i o nr a t e s ,t h e nw i t h
positive probability the lower continuation value must be realized even if the government pursues
the desired policy. This feature necessarily leads to lower payoﬀs along the equilibrium path. In
this sense, the advantage of transparency arises from the ability to tailor the continuation payoﬀ
function precisely to deviations: it can give high payoﬀs only when exactly the right policy is being
pursued, and it can give low payoﬀs when any other policy is used.
Proof of Proposition 2. Let σ be equilibrium strategies in which the money regime is chosen
along the equilibrium path. Let t be the ﬁrst period in which a money regime is chosen. Let
ht be the history of actions along the equilibrium path prior to period t, with agents’ wages
xµt(ht),am o n e yg r o w t hr a t eµt(ht), and the continuation value wµt(π,ht). We construct the
better equilibrium ˜ σ–that is one with higher welfare than σ–as follows. First set ˜ σ so that the
actions of the agents and the government in every period and history before period t are the same
as those speciﬁed in the original set of equilibrium strategies σ. Next, after history ht, let ˜ σ specify
t h a tt h ee x c h a n g er a t er e g i m ei sc h o s e n ,a n dl e t˜ et(ht)=µt(ht) be the exchange rate. Let agents’
12wages be ˜ xet(ht)=˜ et(ht) to ensure that the agents’ incentive compatibility constraint is satisﬁed.
Let ˜ σ specify that for the (unchosen) money regime, ˜ µt(ht)=µt(ht) and ˜ xµt(ht)=µt(ht). For all
other histories that are possible in period t and for all future periods following these histories, set
the actions speciﬁed under ˜ σ equal to those speciﬁed under σ.
Let ¯ wt(ht) and wt(ht) denote the highest and the lowest continuation values following ht
under the equilibrium σ,s ot h a t¯ wt(ht)=m a x π wµt(π,ht) and wt(ht)=m i n π wµt(π,ht),w h e r e
wµt(π,ht) is the continuation value from the original equilibrium in which money is used as an





¯ wt(ht) if et =˜ et(ht)





and let the future strategies under ˜ σ correspond to the strategies under σ that support these
continuation values. Thus, ˜ wet(et,h t) speciﬁes that if the government chooses the prescribed
exchange rate ˜ et(ht), then it receives the highest value that it would have received in the original
equilibrium in which it chose the money regime, while if it chooses any other value, it receives the
lowest value that it would have received in the original equilibrium.
Clearly, to show that our constructed strategies are an equilibrium, we need to show that
they satisfy the incentive constraint for the government following ht when the exchange rate regime
is chosen. To see that this is true, rewrite the incentive constraint when the exchange rate is used
as
(1 − β)[S(˜ xet(ht),e
0
t) − S(˜ xet(ht),˜ et(ht))] ≤ β [¯ wt(ht) − wt(ht)] (13)
and the incentive constraint when money is used as
(1 − β)[R(xµt(ht),µ
0
t) − R(xµt(ht),µ t(ht))] ≤ β
Z
wµt(π,ht)[f(π|µt(ht)) − f(π|µt)]dπ. (14)
By construction, the inherited wages in the exchange rate regime equal those in the money regime,
˜ xet(ht)=xµt(ht), and since the two instruments are equally tight, the functions S and R coincide.
Also by construction,
Z
wµt(π,ht)[f(π|µt(ht)) − f(π|µt)]dπ ≤ ¯ wt(ht) − wt(ht),
so that if (14) holds for any deviation µ0
t, then (13) holds for any deviation e0
t.
13Along the equilibrium path, the payoﬀs under our constructed strategies ˜ σ–the left side of
(11)–are weakly higher than those under σ–the left side of (10)–since
wet(˜ et(ht),h t) =¯ wt(ht) ≥
Z
wµt(π,ht)f(π|µt(ht)) dπ. (15)
Suppose ﬁrst that µt(ht) is strictly less than the static Nash money growth rate. Then (15)
is a strict inequality, and ˜ σ strictly improves welfare. Suppose next that (15) is an equality, so
that ˜ σ does not strictly improve welfare. Then there is an alternative variation that does. In this
alternative variation, in period t the government chooses an exchange rate regime and an exchange
rate that is below static Nash, which is supported by the inﬁnite reversion to static Nash following
any deviation. As long as β>0, such an equilibrium exists.
Next we verify that the new strategies satisfy (12). We have constructed ˜ σ so that the payoﬀ
under a money regime in period t following history ht i st h es a m ea st h ep a y o ﬀ under strategy σ.
By the arguments above, the constructed strategies ˜ σ are such that the payoﬀ in period t following
history ht is strictly higher under an exchange rate regime than under a money regime. Hence,
(12) is satisﬁed with this history.
Finally, we show that our constructed strategies ˜ σ are incentive compatible in periods other
than t and at t for histories other than ht. Note that we have chosen t so that the government follows
an exchange rate regime prior to period t. Hence, the equilibrium path ht occurs with probability
one. The constructed strategies ˜ σ before period t are clearly incentive compatible because they
raise the value to the government of taking the actions along the equilibrium path ht and leave
the values after deviations from this path unchanged. Our strategies ˜ σ are incentive compatible
after period t by construction. Q.E.D.
We have shown that for any equilibrium in which the money growth rate is used as an
instrument in some period, there is an equilibrium in which the exchange rate is used as an
instrument in that same period which leads to higher welfare. Since our construction works for
any equilibrium, the following is an immediate corollary: Along the equilibrium path of the best
equilibrium, the government chooses the exchange rate as the policy instrument with probability
one at all times. (We thank a referee for pointing this out.) (It turns out that when the two
instruments are equally tight, this equilibrium path is supported by reversion to a money regime
following deviations. We discuss this feature of the equilibrium in Section 4 below.)
We next illustrate graphically how the results diﬀer with and without commitment. In Figure
141, we show how the optimal regime varies with the relative tightness of the instruments, which here
correspond to the variances of foreign and domestic shocks. When the government can commit
to its policies, the transparent instrument–that is, the exchange rate regime–is preferred if and
only if the transparent instrument is the tighter one, so that σ2
π∗ <σ 2
ε. This is the region labeled
A in the ﬁgure. When the government cannot commit to its policies, the transparent instrument
is preferred even if the two instruments are equally tight. Thus, the region for which the exchange
rate regime is preferred expands to include the region labeled B as well as region A.
In proving our result, we have imposed no restrictions on strategies besides the natural ones
that arise from the environment. If we restrict strategies in the same way in both regimes, say, to
Markov strategies (as does Stokey [2003]) or to strategies that allow only reversion to the one-shot
equilibrium (as does Canzoneri [1985]), then we obtain similar results when we compare the best
equilibria within these restricted classes. The logic is identical to that for our main result for an
environment with no such restrictions.
In interpreting Proposition 2, note that we are ranking diﬀerent equilibria. The model has
many equilibria, and in any given one, the government bank is choosing its regime optimally taking
as given the behavior of private agents. We have left unspeciﬁed the mechanism by which any
particular equilibrium is implemented. Rather, we have simply shown that in the best equilibrium,
the exchange rate regime is chosen when both instruments are equally tight. Only in this particular
sense have we shown that exchange rates have an advantage over money growth rates as a monetary
policy instrument.
3. Relaxing Some Assumptions
In modeling the idea that exchange rates are easier to monitor than money growth rates,
we have made the simple but extreme assumptions that inﬂation is the only signal of the money
growth rate and that money growth rates are never observed. Here we show that we can relax
those assumptions–allow for multiple signals or for the money growth rate to be observed with a
lag–and still ﬁnd an advantage for transparency.
To see this, suppose ﬁrst that, besides inﬂation, agents also observe another noisy signal of
money growth, denoted η. In an environment in which the government has imperfect control over
money growth, we might interpret this signal η as the realized money growth rate. Let f(π,η|µ)
be the density of inﬂation π and the noisy signal η given the money growth rate µ. Here the
government’s continuation value can vary only with π and η and can be written as w(π,η).T h e









for any possible µ0. Proving the analog of Proposition 2 in this environment is straightforward.
Suppose next that while inﬂation is the only signal of the money growth rate that agents
can observe in the current period, the money growth rate is perfectly observable with a lag; for
simplicity, assume the lag is one period. Speciﬁcally, assume that the money growth rate µt−1 is
observed after agents set their wages in period t. Here, the history on which agents condition their
actions is
ht =( i0,e 0,π0;i1,e 1,π1,µ 0;...;it−1,e t−1,πt−1,µ t−2),
and the history for the government is
Ht =( i0,e 0,π0,µ 0;i1,e 1,π1,µ 0;...;it−1,e t−1,πt−1,µ t−1).
The strategies for the agents and the government are deﬁned as functions of these histories in the
standard way.
The intuition for why transparency is desirable in this environment is clear. Under the
money regime, any deviation in period t is not directly observed in that period. Thus, in period
t+1, agents can react only to a noisy signal of that action. Of course, by period t+2, agents have
observed the government’s period t action, and agents then can precisely react to any deviation
in period t. This lag in the ability to react precisely leads to a tighter incentive constraint under
the money regime and thus gives the transparent exchange rate regime its advantage.
The proof for the result that transparency has an advantage in this environment is similar to
that for Proposition 2, with the exception that if the government discounts the future suﬃciently
little, then the incentive constraint in both regimes is slack, and both regimes can attain the Ram-
sey payoﬀ. When the incentive constraint in both regimes is slack, there is no time inconsistency
problem and, hence, no gain to transparency.
164. The Best Equilibria Without Commitment
In this section, we discuss the equilibrium outcomes implied by our recursive characterization
of the best equilibrium. This best equilibrium outcome diﬀers depending on the tightness of the
two monetary policy instruments. When money growth is suﬃciently tight, the best equilibrium
outcome is implemented with a money regime. Otherwise, it is implemented by an exchange rate
regime. In Atkeson and Kehoe [2003], we formally characterize the outcomes for this environment.
When the exchange rate regime is the preferred regime, the equilibrium outcome is simple.
In each period, the government chooses an exchange rate regime and sets the exchange rate equal
to the best exchange rate policy. If the government deviates from this policy, then the government
and agents revert to the actions that implement the worst equilibrium payoﬀ. These actions may
correspond to either an exchange rate regime or a money regime, depending on the variances of
the shocks. In equilibrium, of course, there are no deviations; hence, the exchange rate is set to the
best exchange rate policy in every period, and inﬂation randomly ﬂuctuates around this exchange
rate.
When the money regime is the preferred regime, the equilibrium outcome looks quite diﬀer-
ent. Under this regime, the government starts by setting the money growth rate equal to some low
growth rate µb (where b indicates best) and sticks to that rate as long as low inﬂation is realized.
Speciﬁcally, the government sets the money growth rate to µb as long as the domestic inﬂation
shock ε is small enough so that µb + ε ≤ πb, where πb is some cutoﬀ rate of inﬂation. In equi-
librium, eventually a large enough domestic inﬂation shock must occur so that realized inﬂation
exceeds πb. After such a shock, the government and agents revert to the actions that implement
the worst equilibrium payoﬀ vw. Thus, under the money regime, the actions that implement the
worst equilibrium payoﬀs eventually occur.
The worst equilibrium payoﬀ vw can occur under either an exchange rate regime or a money
regime, depending on the variances of domestic and foreign inﬂation shocks. This worst equilibrium
payoﬀ is the larger of two payoﬀs . O n eo ft h e s ei st h ew o r s tp a y o ﬀ vw
e that be achieved as an
equilibrium of the subgame starting from a history (possibly oﬀ the equilibrium path) in which
the government has chosen an exchange rate regime. The other potential worst equilibrium payoﬀ
is the corresponding worst payoﬀ vw
µ starting from a history in which the government has chosen
a money regime. That is, vw =m a x {vw
e ,v w
µ}. The worst equilibrium payoﬀ is the larger of these
two payoﬀs because, at the beginning of each period, the government can choose which regime it
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It turns out that when the variances are such that a money regime implements the best
payoﬀ, that regime also implements the worst payoﬀ. In this worst regime, the government starts
by setting the money growth rate equal to some high growth rate µw and continues to do that
as long as the domestic inﬂation shock ε is small enough so that µw + ε ≤ πw, where πw is the
relatively high cutoﬀ rate of inﬂa t i o nu s e di nt h ew o r s tm o n e yr e g i m e .W h e nas u ﬃciently large
domestic inﬂation shock occurs so that realized inﬂation exceeds πw, the government and agents
revert to the actions that implement the best equilibrium payoﬀ. In this sense, when the worst
equilibrium is implemented by a money regime, extremely high inﬂation must be realized before
average inﬂation can fall.
In Figure 2, we illustrate a typical path of money growth and inﬂation outcomes that occur
in the best equilibrium over time when the money regime is used in both the best and the worst
equilibria. In period 0, agents choose low wages xµ = µb, the government chooses a low money
growth rate µb, and realized inﬂation is this low money growth rate plus the domestic inﬂation
shock π0 = µb + ε0. In the ﬁgure, we assume that realized inﬂation π0 is lower than the critical
value πb. Hence, in period 1, agents again choose wages xµ = µb, the government again chooses a
low money growth rate µb, a n dr e a l i z e di n ﬂation is π1 = µb + ε1. The outcomes continue in this
fashion, with agents choosing low wages and the government choosing a low money growth rate,
until the domestic inﬂation shock is large enough so that realized inﬂation exceeds the critical value
πb. In the ﬁgure, this occurs in period 4. Then, in period 5, agents choose high wages xµ = µw,
the government chooses a high money growth rate µw, and realized inﬂation is π5 = µw + ε5.
This pattern continues until the domestic inﬂation shock is large enough so that realized inﬂation
exceeds the high critical value πw. In the ﬁgure, this occurs in period 7. Then, in period 8, the
outcome reverts back to the pattern of agents choosing low wages and the government choosing a
low money growth rate. After that, the outcome cycles stochastically between these two phases,
depending on the realizations of the domestic inﬂation shocks.
We use an argument similar to that in Proposition 2 to characterize the regions of the
parameter space in which the exchange rate regime and the money regime are used in the best
and worst equilibrium outcomes. When the variances of domestic and foreign inﬂation shocks are
the same, vw
e <v w
µ. This is because here the current period payoﬀ functions R and S are the
same, and the incentive constraint is looser under an exchange rate regime than under a money
18regime. Hence, when these variances are the same, the worst equilibrium payoﬀ vw = vw
µ. Clearly,
increasing the variance of foreign inﬂation shocks above that of domestic inﬂation shocks reduces
vw
e and leaves vw
µ unchanged. Hence, vw = vw
µ when the variance of foreign inﬂation shocks exceeds
that of domestic inﬂation shocks.
In Figure 3, we combine this result with that in Proposition 2 to characterize which regimes
are used in the best and the worst equilibria in each part of the parameter space. If the variance
of foreign inﬂation shocks is suﬃciently high relative to that of domestic inﬂation shocks, as in
region C of the ﬁgure, then the government follows a money regime in both the best and the
worst equilibria. If the variance of foreign shocks is suﬃciently low relative to that of domestic
shocks, as in region E, then the government follows an exchange rate regime in both the best and
the worst equilibria. When the variances of the two inﬂation shocks are similar, as in region D,
then the government uses an exchange rate regime in the best equilibrium and a money regime in
the worst equilibrium. In regions D and E, the best outcome is an exchange rate regime with a
constant e in every period. In region C, the best outcome stochastically cycles between high and
low inﬂation as discussed above.
5. Transparency and Tightness of Interest Rates
We have focused on two instruments of monetary policy, money growth and exchange rates.
Many central banks often describe their monetary policy in terms of nominal interest rates. Here
we discuss the transparency and tightness of monetary policy under two diﬀerent interpretations
of what an interest rate policy might mean.
We add interest rates to our model by appending to it a Fisher equation for the nominal
interest rate it:
it =¯ r + Etπt+1, (16)
where ¯ r is the constant real interest rate and Et denotes conditional expectation at t. Using (16)
in (1) and (2), we can write nominal interest rates in terms of exchange rates and money growth:
it =¯ r + Etet+1,a n d (17)
it =¯ r + Etµt+1. (18)
One interpretation of an interest rate policy is that the government actually uses either
exchange rates or money growth as its instrument and the interest rate is merely a convenient
19statistic (or target) to convey to the private agents its plan for expected inﬂation. Under this
interpretation, the government’s strategy in the game is the same as before. In each period,
the government chooses the regime and then the speciﬁc level of either et or µt in that regime.
This government strategy then implies a sequence of interest rates it from (17) and (18). If the
government wants a diﬀerent sequence of interest rates, it can choose a diﬀerent strategy for et or
µt.
Here the interest rate adds nothing to the transparency of either regime. In particular, under
a money regime, since money growth is unobserved, when inﬂation is not what was expected, or
πt 6= Et−1πt, private agents cannot tell whether this is because of the shock εt or because the
government has deviated from the equilibrium path in its choice of µt. Note that observing interest
rates does not help the private agents sort out why πt 6= Et−1πt. Under an exchange rate regime,
private agents can already ﬁgure out why πt 6= Et−1πt, using et = πt − π∗
t, because they see et.
Knowledge of the interest rate adds no information. The interest rate also adds nothing to the
tightness of either regime because inﬂation is still determined by (1) and (2).
An alternative interpretation of an interest rate policy is that the government uses the
interest rate as more than a target statistic. Under this interpretation, the government sets up a
desk that buys and sells bonds for money at some ﬁxed price (or borrows and lends reserves at
some ﬁxed rate). Private agents then determine the amount of money in circulation–and, hence,
inﬂation–endogenously. Under this interpretation, the instrument of monetary policy is what
interest rate to set. We call this formulation of an interest rate policy an interest rate regime.W e
can model this regime by having the government choose the interest rate and having the private
agents determine the money growth rate µ. Agents each choose the growth of their own individual
money holdings ν, and the aggregate money growth rate µ is then the average of these rates.
Such an interest rate regime is transparent in the same way that an exchange rate regime is.
In particular, private agents can see immediately if the government deviates from its strategy of
trading at a particular price. Moreover, each agent knows that when πt 6= Et−1πt, the discrepancy
is not because the government has deviated.
It is not at all clear, however, how tight such an interest rate regime would be. For the
standard reasons, in such a regime, the private agents’ choice of money growth is indeterminate–
its conditional mean is pinned down by the interest rate set by the government in conjunction
with (18), but the state-by-state realizations are otherwise free. This feature corresponds to the
20standard indeterminacy problem associated with choosing interest rates as instruments in general
equilibrium models. (The literature abounds with analyses of the indeterminacy issue in models in
which the government can commit to its policy. Seldom addressed, however, is the much thornier
issue of what happens when the government cannot commit.)
In practice, how do central banks actually use interest rates in the conduct of monetary
policy? In recent years, in the United States, our ﬁrst interpretation of an interest rate policy
seems to apply. The FOMC sets a target for the federal funds rate, and then the trading desk
at the New York Federal Reserve Bank chooses quantity adjustments to reserves to implement
this target. In this sense, we think of the Fed’s policy as having the interest rate as a target but
using quantities (of money) as the instrument. That is, the interest rate target is a convenient
summary statistic to inform the public about what is actually a very complicated state-contingent
money growth rule. Central banks in other countries, however, such as Canada, Australia, and
New Zealand, seem to use an interest rate desk similar to that in our second interpretation.
In their study of U.S. monetary history, Friedman and Schwartz [1963, Section 10.3] discuss
an interesting mid—20th century episode in which the United States seemed to be using the interest
rate as an instrument. During that period, that instrument was transparent, but it did not seem
to be tight. From August 1945 to August 1948, nominal interest rates were quite low, ranging
from 1 percent to 3 percent, while annual inﬂation was quite high, about 16 percent. (Note that
some of this inﬂation was from the end of wartime price controls.) Friedman and Schwartz argue
that during this period, the Fed was following a policy of providing all the high-powered money
demanded at a ﬁxed rate, so that the Fed had no direct control over the money supply. In this
sense, the interest rate policy was transparent, but it was certainly not tight.
6. Concluding Remarks
We have shown that transparency is a desirable characteristic for a monetary policy instru-
ment when a government cannot commit to follow a given policy. In such an environment, a
transparent instrument has a natural advantage: it gives the public the ability to detect policy
deviations, and that ability mitigates the government’s credibility problem.
Calvo and Végh [1999] argue that the exchange rate has a natural advantage over the money
growth rate as a monetary policy instrument because it is a price rather than a quantity. A natural
question is, does this analysis extend to the relative advantage of another price, the interest rate,
over the money growth rate as a monetary policy instrument? As we have discussed, our analysis
21suggests that the answer depends on how the interest rate is used in the conduct of monetary
policy.
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24Notes
1In assuming that the rate of depreciation of the exchange rate is the instrument of policy,
we are allowing for any type of crawling peg in an exchange rate regime. Hence, in no sense are
exchange rates necessarily ﬁxed in the exchange rate regime. Moreover, our work here is about
the choice of two types of instruments and is silent on any issues concerning the choice of ﬁxed
versus ﬂexible exchange rates.
2We thank Stokey [2003] for this terminology.
3In this regard, our model builds in a stylized way the classic Mundellian tradeoﬀ between
using the money growth rate and using the exchange rate as the monetary instrument. For a
r e c e n tm o d e lw i t hs u c hat r a d e o ﬀ, see the work by Alesina and Barro [2002] on currency unions.
4Canzoneri [1985] was the ﬁrst to use the logic of Green and Porter [1984] to explain periodic
bouts of high inﬂation. See also the work of Zarazaga [1995], who extends this logic, and Albanesi,
Chari, and Christiano [2001], who use multiple Markov equilibria to obtain similar outcomes.
5A related literature uses signaling models to look at the issue of transparency somewhat
diﬀerently. Herrendorf [1999] considers an environment with two types of monetary authority: one
with and one without a commitment technology. The monetary authority must choose between a
transparent ﬁxed exchange rate regime and an opaque ﬂoating exchange rate regime. Herrendorf
shows that if the public has suﬃciently strong beliefs that the monetary authority can commit,
then both types choose the ﬁxed exchange rate regime. We think of Herrendorf’s model as applying
to countries with governments that are likely to have the power to commit and, hence, do not face
signiﬁcant time inconsistency problems in monetary policy. In contrast, we think of our model
as applying to countries with governments that have had chronic problems committing to good
policies. Canavan and Tommasi [1997] explore a theme similar to that of Herrendorf [1999] in a
model with unobserved types that are required to choose linear strategies. For related work in a
domestic context, see the analysis of Backus and Driﬃll [1985].
There is also some work in this literature on the issue of transparency in monetary pol-
icy. Cukierman and Meltzer [1986] and Faust and Svensson [2001, 2002] explore linear signaling
outcomes in models with unobserved types.
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Parameter regions for which an exchange rate regime is preferred  











*With commitment, exchange rate regimes are preferred in region A, where the variance of 
domestic inflation shocks is greater than the variance of foreign inflation shocks. With no 
commitment, exchange rate regimes have an additional advantage; they are preferred in 
both region A and region B. 
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*In region C, the money regime is followed in both the best and the worst equilibria.  In 
region D, the exchange rate regime is followed in the best equilibria and the money 
regime is followed in the worst equilibria.  In region E, the exchange rate regime is 
followed in both the best and the worst equilibria. 
 
µ in best 
and worst 
e in best  
and worst 
e in best,  
µ in worst 
Variance of 
foreign shocks
 
Variance of 
domestic shocks 
C 
45°
 
D 
E 